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Abstract 
This article explains the peculiarities of institutional effects on growth rates in post-communist countries. 
By proposing a certain dependence of the institution-growth nexus on the nature of institutional 
emergence, the distinction between revolutionary and evolutionary processes of institution formation is 
introduced. Theoretical and empirical juxtapositions show that transition countries’ institutions which are 
constructed revolutionarily differ from those that emerge evolutionarily in a twofold manner in their 
relationship to growth. Growth rates of their economies are less likely to depend on the quality of 
economic institutions and are more likely to be a function of the maturity of political institutions. In 
addition, economic institutions in post-communist countries are a product of the quality of political 
bodies to a greater extent than their evolutionary alternatives.  
JEL Classification: O17, O43, O57, P26, P37 
Keywords: Economic Growth, Formal Institutions, Institutional Formation, Institutional 
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1. Introduction 
The collapse of socialism led to multifaceted and profound changes in the 
political, economic, and social systems of post-socialist countries. Formal institutions 
were expected to mold these changes into a legal framework and define new rules 
according to which the economy and society were supposed to operate. However, 
introducing free market formal institutions did not lead to the expected outcomes in 
many of the former socialist economies. The well-functioning institutions of capitalism, 
which are the foundation of economic development according to growth theory, proved 
rather dysfunctional in post-communist conditions (Polterovich 2005, 2008; Radygin 
and Entov 2008). The relationship between the quality of formal institutions and rates 
of economic growth appeared to be peculiar, differing from the pattern usually found in 
developed and/or developing countries. 
This study seeks to demonstrate that the revolutionary approach, through which 
key formal institutions were formed in post-communist countries, can explain these 
institutions' relative dysfunctionality and inefficiency in fostering economic growth. We 
argue that the revolutionary mode of institution building occurred independently from 
both the culture economic agents were accustomed to and trends in economic structural 
transformations, resulting in institutions that were incompatible with informal norms 
and features of local economic systems. 
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2. Literature overview 
Growth theory asserts that good formal institutions are conducive to rapid 
economic development. Empirical evidence from economically developed and/or 
developing countries (Eicher and Leukert 2009) largely supports this claim (see 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for an overview) with regard to both political (Chen 
and Feng 1996; Klomp and de Haan 2009; Narayan et al. 2011) and economic 
institutions (Rodrik et al. 2002). Post-communist countries are rarely included in such 
analyses, because they represent a unique group (Bosworth and Collins 2003).   
Research has been conducted independently on these countries. Studies found 
mixed evidence depending on the type of formal institutions analyzed, statistical 
methods used or the range of countries included. They either substantiate conventional 
findings that institutions positively impact growth rates (see Aslund (2007) for a detailed 
overview). Or, they recognize peculiarities concerning the effect that formal institutional 
frameworks have on economic growth, with the sign and strength of this impact varying 
depending on the phase of transition or the maturity of formal institutions (Fidrmuc 
and Tichit 2009; De Melo et al. 1997; Falcetti et al. 2000). Studies stemming from 
former Soviet Union countries go even further and entirely negate the claim that free-
market formal institutions per se may lead to economic prosperity in the post-socialist 
world (Mau 2007; Petrunya and Ivashina 2010; Polischuk 2008; Polterovich 2008). 
These formal institutions lack compatibility with post-communist informal norms due 
to transition countries' insignificant historical experience with democracy and free 
markets (Yasin 2003) or due to unique features of their economic systems (the military 
sector’s prevalence in their production capacities, dominant large companies, and a deep 
recession that started at the outset of transition) (Polterovich 2005; Polterovich and 
Popov 2006). 
In addition, the lack of strong political context, which assumes an independent 
political sector from the economic sector, is believed to hinder these countries from 
improving formal institutions. Their political elite often become economic elite (Aslund 
2007), as a result of which institutional reforms simply promote the redistribution of 
economic or political power without generating substantial economic growth 
(Dementiev and Vishnevskiy 2011). As a consequence, many transition economies 
appear to be locked in an institutional trap (Polterovich 2005), with any institutional 
improvement being associated with considerable economic and social losses 
(Polterovich 2008). The introduction of private property in Russia and the Ukraine 
exemplifies this process: Local managers with close connections to the regional 
government accumulated hundreds of thousands of hectares while most of the local 
population was deprived of land. This practice led to a considerable output drop and 
increases in poverty levels. 
Irrespective of the sign found in the relationship between formal institutions and 
economic growth, studies on transition economies possess one common feature: The 
impact of their formal institutions on growth is rarely tested in conjunction with 
developed and/or developing countries. An indirect comparison of results is hardly 
possible, since analyses do not use a standard set of conditioning variables and standard 
periods that would enable comparing findings.  
One should note that, in general, growth theory recognizes the existence of 
heterogeneity in the effects of formal institutions. It is well-established that the direction 
or strength of institutions' impact on growth varies depending on the maturity level of 
formal institutions (Barro 1997; Fidrmuc and Tichit 2009; Przeworski and Limongi 
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1993) or a country’s level of economic prosperity (Eicher and Leukert 2009; Lee and 
Kim 2009). However, we doubt that these two explanations are exhaustive for all post-
communist countries. Transition economies started their institutional reforms from a 
relatively similar platform in terms of their level of economic development (see 
appendix 1) and the type and degree of institutional maturity but ended up at very 
different success levels. We argue that the cross-country variation of institutional effects 
on economic growth can also be attributed to the way in which such institutions were 
formed. The peculiar relationship of economic institutions to growth rates in transition 
economies can also be explained by the revolutionary nature of their institution building 
and socio-economic forces resulting from this process.  
The latter proposition requires that a theoretical model be constructed to 
juxtapose the post-communist pattern of institution building with the pattern prevalent 
in other countries to identify implications that this mode of institution formation may 
have for a country’s growth dynamics. This study adopts the conventional definition of 
formal institutions as the basic formal rules, such as laws and regulations, that govern 
interactions among economic agents. We further narrow the concept of formal 
institutions to legal economic institutions, such as property rights and contract 
enforcement legislation, since they are viewed as the key to economic growth (North 
1990) and have been the least successfully reformed in post-communist countries 
(Aslund 2007).  
3. Analytical model  
We assume that economic processes have certain characteristics and operate 
within a system of rules. Some of these rules require legislative action and others do not. 
Rules that do not necessitate legislative action constitute informal institutions. Rules 
needing such action are formal institutions. We further assume that any legislative action 
is ascribed to formal rules and enforced by the central government, which operates 
within a set of political rules. We argue that an economy grows smoothly when formal 
rules are compatible with informal rules and features of political and economic systems. 
We also assert that the odds of ensuring this compatibility vary depending on the mode 
of institutional grafting.  
Economics offers two primary views on how formal institutions emerge: top-
down and bottom-up (Boudreaux and Alicia 2007; Easterly 2008). The bottom-up 
perspective assumes that institutions develop spontaneously from cultural values and 
norms of individuals within a society, with the written law only formalizing what is 
already mainly shaped by people’s attitudes (Easterly 2008). In this case, institutional 
change is seen as gradual in nature and constrained by previous institutions while 
institutional reforms are expected to be additive and cannot attempt too much (Platteau 
1996). Drastic changes in the existing institutions are believed to harm the economy, 
even if there is no obvious reason for such institutions to exist (Easterly 2008). 
Institutions are deemed unique to a society and closely linked to its history. As such, 
societies are expected to diverge in their formal institutions both in the short and long 
run (Boudreaux and Alicia 2007).   
In the top-down approach, by contrast, political leaders declare laws to create 
institutions (Easterly 2008). Since the notion of institutions is limited to laws, the 
government can easily adopt new institutions at any time. Derived from this premise, 
this approach advocates determining an optimal set of formal institutions that can be 
designed from scratch and introduced in any country (Boudreaux and Alicia 2007). 
  
4 
Some go even further and suggest that there might be “one globally unique best set of 
institutions, towards which all societies are thought to be developing” (Easterly 2008). 
Hence, copying institutions from more advanced societies to less advanced ones is 
deemed possible and efficient.  
We use this distinction as a point of departure and integrate it into evolutionary 
and revolutionary modes of institutional grafting (Matthews 1995; North 1990; 
Poznanski 1995). We consider the two latter terms to be of higher order, since they 
assume that a certain method of institution building is applied not only to one or a few 
selective formal institutions but to the vast majority of such institutions, resulting in a 
profound transformation of the entire institutional framework. For the purpose of our 
research, we adopt the conventional concept “evolutionary,” which is often used in 
institutional economics, and limit it to a gradual and cumulative change in institutions 
that usually results from a bottom-up emergence of rules (Easterly 2008). We use the 
term revolutionary institution building when referring to an abrupt and profound 
alteration of the entire institutional framework that presupposes the design of new 
institutions from scratch while relying on a top-down approach. One should note that 
the term “revolutionary” does not entail violence in the institutional change process but 
rather emphasizes the radical nature of transformations in the existing institutional 
framework.   
We argue that if an evolutionary mode of reforms is implemented, which largely 
rely on the bottom-up emergence of institutions, such institutions are expected to be a 
positive determinant of economic growth. If a revolutionary method with a top-down 
approach to creating formal institutions is applied then new formal rules are likely to 
play an insignificant role in promoting economic growth, at least in the short run. Such 
institutions are expected to be incompatible with informal norms, political traditions, 
and features of local economic systems. The extent of such incompatibility will be 
determined by the pressure that economic agents exercise concerning introducing new 
formal rules, whether the new rules are appropriate for the maturity level of the 
economic system, previous historical experience with similar rules, or the population’s 
desires to conform their behaviors to the new political and economic orders. 
To demonstrate the validity of the above arguments, we use Portes’s sociological 
model of institution building (2006). According to this conceptual framework, 
institutional grafting is influenced by a dual set of forces. On the one hand, there is 
culture which consists of moral values and norms that manifest themselves in certain 
role expectations regarding the conduct of economic agents or representatives of 
authority. On the other hand, there is social structure that includes power and elites who 
are embedded within a certain class structure with a clearly specified status hierarchy. 
The theory asserts that institutions, regardless of their formation mode, should be 
compatible with the culture and social structure to function successfully. If institutions 
emerge from social norms, customs, beliefs, or traditions within a society (Easterly 
2008), dominant classes and political elites must be persuaded or compelled to legalize 
them (Portes 2006). If imposed by political elites, institutional change must presuppose 
an alteration of the underlying values to enable their cultural acceptance (Portes 2006).   
We expand this approach by arguing that successful institution building is 
embedded within a three-dimensional structure, and three oppositional forces to 
institutional change may result if this structure is not complied with. The first dimension 
is culture as in Portes (2006). It includes prevalent values/norms that dictate right and 
wrong, as well as behaviors describing how likely it is that an individual’s conduct 
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deviates from their good morals. The second dimension is social structure, where we 
follow Portes (2006) by distinguishing between political elites who formalize institutions 
and class structure, which predefines the population’s potential level of deliberate 
resistance to institutional change. The third dimension is economic structure, which 
describes the rationale behind and the nature of economic arrangements and economic 
infrastructure in a country. It may include financial and banking systems, taxation, trade 
union, labor market institutions, industrial relations, etc. It determines the extent to 
which a country’s economic system, and economic processes embedded within that 
system, are in tune with the logic of formal institutions. Hence, compatibility is expected 
to exist between formal economic institutions and these three dimensions. 
If analyzed within this theoretical framework, the logic of the evolutionary 
approach can be described as follows. As economic agents operate, they accumulate 
knowledge and experiences, which lead to technological change and further promote the 
division of labor (Davis 2010; Groenewegen et al. 1995). This shifts the organization of 
a country’s production processes and, hence, results in alterations to economic 
structures. Profound change in the economic domain leads to transformations in how 
economic agents think and the values they hold. As a result, existing formal institutions 
are no longer adequate and commensurate with both economic structures (i.e. prevalent 
technologies, economic processes) and preferences among economic agents, thereby 
raising market transaction costs (North 1990). Contractual arrangements begin to create 
demand for institutional change that can lower transaction costs to exploit new 
opportunities (Pejovich 1999). In trying to overcome the existing inconsistencies, 
economic agents introduce informal changes (Eggertsson 1997) among formal “rules of 
the game,” thereby making the institutional framework more flexible.3 If efficient and 
compatible with the interests of political elites (Portes 2006), these changes are captured 
by the political system, which formalizes and legalizes them. As a result, they acquire the 
status of formal institutions. Private international commercial law provides an example 
of evolutionary institution formation (Boettke et al. 2008): The development of cross-
culture exchange in 11th- and 12th-century Europe led to the spontaneous formation of 
the lex mercatoria, an informal system of customary law rooted in international 
commercial norms (Boettke et al. 2008). These informal institutions appeared to be 
effective and were later formalized into international commercial law.  
Hence, the logic of institutional evolution entails the following: First, the 
formation process is initiated by economic agents through the bottom-up approach and, 
therefore, new institutions are likely to be consistent with the values economic agents 
hold. Second, formal institutions are fully compatible with existing economic structure, 
since changes in the old institutions primarily occur as a reaction to shifts in the 
economic system or technologies. Third, the role of political elites in institution creation 
is relatively insignificant and restricted to formalizing institutions that previously 
emerged at the micro-level. The flexibility of political bodies, however, determines how 
rapidly new institutions that meet such demand are adopted (Davis 2010).   
The distinct feature of the revolutionary approach to institution formation is 
that shifts in a country’s political system, often triggered by a political regime change, 
precede changes in its economic system (Fidrmuc 2003). Such reforms rarely require the 
population’s broad support, since the economic crisis caused by the previous regime’s 
shortcomings serves to justify introducing essential alterations in both political and 
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rules and changed economic conditions can be resolved. 
  
6 
economic systems (Olson 1982). Alternatively, the population’s dissatisfaction with the 
current regime can encourage citizens to demand changes in both political and 
economic domains even if the incumbent elites resist such reforms. Radical political 
change can occur either through revolutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), as recent 
events in Arabic countries demonstrate, or in a peaceful manner without wars and coups 
(Olson 1982), as in the majority of post-communist countries during the collapse of 
socialism (Aslund 2007).  
Radical political alterations require adjusting the institutional framework to the 
new political logic and promote an immediate introduction of an entirely new set of 
formal economic institutions, commensurate with the logic of the new political regime. 
During this process, political elites and public and private actors usually have limited 
knowledge about the way the new economic system should function. As such, the 
process of building a new institutional framework relies on the top-down approach and 
often involves borrowing legal rules from countries with political and economic orders 
close to those desired in the new conditions. Instead of stemming from local cultures or 
economic structures, the formal rules are therefore imposed from without (Pejovich 
1999). This, in turn, can lead to two kinds of problems.  
On the one hand, implanting foreign institutions into a specific local context 
through the top-down method often lacks an appropriate analysis of their compatibility 
with characteristics of local economic structures. When copying Western industrial 
legislation designed for postindustrial societies with a prevalence of medium and small 
businesses, many CIS governments did not, for instance, take into account that their 
economies are still characterized by the overrepresentation of large enterprises 
(Polterovich and Popov 2006), which made new rules a priori suboptimal for the existing 
economic systems. Reforms aimed at enforcing changes in economic structures and 
bridging the divide between the recipient- and source-countries of formal institutions 
become necessary, but in practice are often left to random forces with institutional 
change expected to generate the required structural change (Eggertsson 1997).  
On the other hand, a similar inconsistency is also believed to emerge between 
new formal institutions and cultures (Kyriazis and Zouboulakis 2005; Portes 2006). 
Since transition countries are highly likely to possess their own mentality, behavioral 
patterns, and business cultures (Chavance 2008; Matveenko 2005; Tridico 2006), their 
economic agents often interpret newly imported formal institutions in markedly 
different ways from their initial context. This may result in a mutation of the new formal 
institutions (Vernikov 2009) or low enforcement levels (Portes 2006).  
The learning experience is expected to minimize or eliminate both kinds of 
inconsistencies (Nelson and Sampat 2001). If policymakers design and introduce 
adjustment policies for the system’s orderly operation at each stage during the transition 
period, the incompatibility between the new economic institutions and economic 
structures is believed to be gradually narrowed. Similarly, if economic actors learn that 
adapting to the new economic institutions can expand their opportunity set, they may 
change their cultural values and behaviors. For instance, post-communist countries in 
which new democratic governments successfully introduced economic reforms 
experienced a rise in pro-democratic attitudes among citizens (Aslund 2007). Successful 
reformers have also nurtured strong support for a free-market economy (Aslund 2007). 
These learning processes imply, however, that there are lags between fundamental 
institutional change being initiated and the time when the relevant actors get the 
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structures right (Eggertsson 1997), producing a positive impact for the local economy 
only in later periods (De Melo et al. 1997; Falcetti et al. 2000). 
Japan’s post-war reconstruction, which included changes in the political regime, 
major economic rules, and legislation, is a good example of the revolutionary approach 
to institutional grafting (Boettke et al. 2008). Overall, the revolutionary mode of 
institution formation includes the following features: First, the formation of economic 
institutions is handled by political elites through the top-down approach, and hence, it is 
likely that these institutions will be incompatible with the existing values, at least at the 
initial stage of institutional reforms. Second, the top-down approach to institution 
building can create inconsistencies between economic institutions and the current 
economic structure. Third, the role of political elites is superior and cannot be confined 
to legalizing new institutions, but extends itself to their selection, design, introduction, 
and subsequent adjustment to existing values and economic structures.  
In sum, institutional change is an evolutionary one when: (1) it is not 
accompanied by a political regime change; (2) new institutions mainly emerge through a 
bottom-up approach; and (3) new formal institutions are initiated by economic agents as 
a result of their functioning based on existing values and within existing economic 
structures. If institutional transformations result from top-down institutional reforms, 
the pattern remains evolutionary in nature so long as only some aspects of the existing 
institutional framework are subject to radical alterations, and the entire institutional 
framework’s logic remains unchanged. A good illustration of this is the opening of 
previously closed professions in Greece, which required only certain adjustments in the 
competition law. Profound institutional change can also happen, but it remains gradual 
in nature, with substantial alterations in formal institutions or in the entire institutional 
framework occurring relatively slowly (Efendic et al. 2011), giving enough time for 
values and economic structures to co-evolve with institutions and to adapt to the new 
rules. The pattern turns into a revolutionary one if alterations: (1) are imposed by 
changes in political institutions that primarily occur as a result of a political regime 
change; (2) abruptly transform widespread areas of the entire institutional framework; 
and (3) new institutions are designed from scratch by the government rather than 
economic agents and usually emerge by replicating institutions from more advanced 
societies through a top-down approach.  
The difference between the two modes of institution building can be 
demonstrated by juxtaposing China with former Soviet Union countries. China is an 
example of evolutionary change: It preserved the existing communist one-party political 
regime and gradually shifted to capitalism by introducing economic and legal reforms in 
only certain aspects of competition policy, pricing policy, etc. In contrast to China, 
many post-communist countries transitioned from socialism to capitalism through a 
revolutionary process of institution building. These countries started their transition by 
changing their political regimes. Their entire institutional frameworks have been 
subjected to substantial alterations through top-down reforms to abruptly dismantle 
communist institutions and introduce capitalist ones: private property rights protection, 
free competition, etc. Even those institutions that were preserved from the previous 
regime, such as courts, underwent substantial alterations. New formal institutions were 
designed by central governments from scratch by replicating institutional sets from 
more advanced West-European societies.  
Understanding the main differences between evolutionary and revolutionary 
modes of institution formation allows us to formulate four propositions for growth 
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theory. Proposition 1: Economic institutions that emerged in a revolutionary way might be 
less effective for economic development than those formed through the evolutionary 
mode, since they are less likely to be compatible with features of local economic 
structures and cultures, at least in the short run.  
Proposition 2: Since revolutionary institutional change involves a learning process 
for both political elites and economic agents, there will be lengthy lags between the 
initiation of fundamental institutional change and the time when institutional 
frameworks are optimized. Political elites need time to experiment and learn how to 
design and operate new formal institutions. In turn, economic agents must learn how to 
act according to the new rules. Common sense also suggests that the learning process 
might be non-linear, hence, as institutional elements approach optimal design, they must 
induce better learning.  
Proposition 3: Since the revolutionary mode of institution building presupposes 
radical change in the set of formal institutions, a country's economic growth becomes a 
function of the ability of political elites to ensure a smooth transition to new 
institutions, and if necessary, to introduce measures aimed at tailoring and adjusting 
economic structures and/or cultures to the new rules of the game. By contrast, the 
evolutionary pathway is mainly characterized by the introduction of insignificant 
cumulative changes into existing institutions that seldom require such adaptation 
measures or coordinating actions on the part of the government.  
Proposition 4: Since the revolutionary mode requires more involvement from 
political elites during the institutional formation phase and includes a greater degree of 
learning, the quality of economic institutions largely becomes a function of the 
experience and skillfulness of politicians in dealing with institutional grafting. Their 
ability to minimize the difference between current features of economic structures, 
cultures, and newly introduced institutions determines whether the institution creating 
processes are successful and newly imported formal economic institutions survive and 
function effectively. 
Based on these propositions, we deduce five hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The positive impact of economic institutions on economic growth 
is greater when such institutions are formed evolutionarily rather than via revolutionary 
change.  
Hypothesis 2: An improvement in economic institutions is associated with (a) 
lagged and (b) non-linear improvements in rates of economic growth when such 
economic institutions are formed revolutionarily. 
Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of a national political system’s quality on rates 
of economic growth is greater when institution formation occurs via revolutionary 
change rather than via evolutionary change. 
Hypothesis 4: The quality of formal institutions are more dependent on the 
national political system’s quality when such institutions are formed via revolutionary 
change rather than via evolutionary change. 
Hypothesis 5: If institutional reforms occur via revolutionary institutional change, 
countries that minimize incompatibilities between new formal economic institutions as 
well as their values and economic structures are associated with greater improvements in 
their formal institutions.  
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4. Data and method description 
To test these hypotheses, we use Eicher’s and Leukert’s (2009) approach of splitting the 
sample into subsamples and conducting an empirical analysis for each of them. In 
forming our subsamples, we use the idea that revolutionary institutional change 
presupposes a simultaneous transformation of the entire framework of formal 
institutions. Since such a radical transformation usually occurs because of a shift in the 
nature of economic relations and the logic of economic processes, we assume that only 
a political regime change can initiate revolutionary institutional reforms. This means that 
in choosing countries for our sample, the type of political regime and form of autocracy 
or democracy which the selected countries have was irrelevant. Instead, what matters is 
whether there was any sudden transition from one political regime to another. This idea 
is also in line with the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis, which assumes that formal 
economic institutions are a function of political institutions within which a certain 
political regime is embedded.  
To identify whether a country has experienced recent changes in its political 
regime, we use the POLITY IV Project’s website 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), which provides information about 
political regime characteristics and transitions between 1800 and 2012 with a polity 
score for a wide range of countries (see appendix 2 for a country choice description). 
The values of a country’s annual polity score range from -10 to 10, with values 6 and 
above denoting full democracy and -6 and below denoting full autocracy. In our 
analysis, a country qualifies as revolutionary if: (1) there was a political regime change in 
which values shifted from at least -6 or below to at least 6 and above; (2) this change is 
rapid and occurred within a few years; (3) this change occurred after 1970. Any earlier 
transition is expected to produce institutions that would adhere to the local structural 
and cultural characteristics through the learning process and eliminate any 
inconsistencies. In this case, the new formal institutions would follow an evolutionary 
path in their maturation process; (4) the change is stable with no signs of reverting to 
the previous regime in the following years; (5) there have not been persistent 
fluctuations in the regime trend of more than 3 points since 1970. Regime trend 
fluctuations denote political instability, which is a separate issue with respect to growth 
analysis and has both positive and negative effects on economic development (Jong-A-
Pin 2009).  
Since we are primarily interested in transition economies, our base revolutionary 
subsample only includes 21 post-communist countries that initiated a transition to 
democracy with a free market economy. One should note that these countries are 
relatively heterogeneous in their historical trends (Soviet Union membership, experience 
with private property during communism, etc.) and present characteristics (EU 
membership, democracy types, etc.). We justify unifying them in one sample, because 
they all had a one-party political regime during communism with a centrally planned 
economic system. And they all underwent a profound institutional transformation with 
the same target: transition to a free market economy and the introduction of democracy, 
which involved a radical change in the rules governing both political and economic 
processes. The fact that they differ in their starting points does not contradict the 
purpose of our analysis, since the quantitative impact of initial conditions on the set of 
reforms and economic growth is small and tends to rapidly decline over time (Berg et al. 
1999; Falcetti et al. 2000). To ensure that the empirical results are not unique to post-
communist countries, we expand the revolutionary subsample by including non-post-
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communist countries that meet the above criteria, thereby increasing this subsample to 
42 countries. 
Countries that have not experienced political regime change or have experienced 
profound but gradual change (each stage of change not being greater than a 3-point 
fluctuation in the polity score) are considered evolutionary. The base evolutionary 
subsample is limited to 22 old and stable democracies or autocracies to avoid a 
disproportionate subsample size. Since most of these countries are relatively advanced 
in their economic development, we expand this subsample by adding other developed 
and developing countries and augmenting the subsample’s size to 45 countries. These 
countries are also heterogeneous in their characteristics but have one feature in 
common: There has not been any rapid change in their political regime. Appendix 3 lists 
the countries included in the subsamples.   
We are primarily interested in comparing how formal economic and political 
institutions impact economic growth for the two country groups: evolutionary and 
revolutionary. The quality of economic institutions is approximated through a contract 
enforcement and property rights protection index sourced from the 2007 annual report 
of the Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et al. 2007). The values vary from 1 
(poorly defined economic institutions) to 10 (well-defined economic institutions). 
Formal institutions are considered to be good when they are clearly defined and well-
enforced, which means that the selected institutional scores are closer to 10.  
The quality of political institutions is measured through the control of 
corruption in government, government effectiveness, the quality of regulation, and 
voice and accountability. All political indexes are sourced from the World Bank Group 
database and vary from -2.5 (bad political situation) to 2.5 (ideal political situation). The 
four indexes are highly correlated, with the voice and accountability index showing the 
greatest uniqueness in its variance (see table 1). We use this index to describe the quality 
of democratic settings in a country. The three remaining indexes are combined by using 
the STATA predict option for factor analysis to construct a single measure of the 
policymaking quality.   
 
Table 1. Factor loading and unique variances for political scores  
VARIABLES   Factor Uniqueness 
Voice and accountability  0.894 0.162 
Government effectiveness  0.972 0.038 
Regulatory quality 0.953 0.073 
Corruption control in government  0.948 0.065 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for key variables of the extended subsamples 
VARIABLES 
No. of 
observati
ons 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
The evolutionary subsample       
GDP per capita growth 552 2.871 3.532 -6.060    31.800 
Legal  institutions 436 6.827 1.917 1.200 9.600 
Corruption perception index  480 6.104 2.490 1.300 10.000 
Democratic settings quality 470 0.286 1.221 -2.243 1.826 
Policy-making quality  479 0.219 0.990 -2.165 1.516 
Gross capital formation 566 22.721 8.334 8.000 114.000 
Inflation 550 4.497 6.152 -13.800   57.100 
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Life expectancy  576 73.010 8.917 35.000 85.000 
Social trust 216 0.382 0.151 0.150 0.700 
Freedom of choice 204 6.992 0.704 5.720 7.870 
Obedience 216 0.316 0.142 0.060  0.610 
Tolerance 216 0.786 0.084 0.610   0.920 
Latitude 576 0.366 0.198 0.014 0.711 
Civil liberties 312 1.821 1.394 1.000 6.000 
The revolutionary subsample      
GDP per capita growth 528 3.466 4.624 -37.360   26.000 
Legal  institutions 389 5.183 1.225 1.900 8.700 
Corruption perception index  424 3.557 1.343 0.400 7.500 
Democratic settings quality 450 0.150 0.628 -1.584 1.218 
Policy-making quality  448 0.113 0.969 -2.939 2.215 
Gross capital formation 523 23.296  7.205 4.000 75.000 
Inflation 509 9.914 12.978 -9.600 121.600 
Life expectancy  528 67.398 8.858 41.000 80.000 
Social trust 348 0.228 0.072 0.060 0.470 
Freedom of choice 348 6.451 0.675 5.370 7.480 
Obedience 348 0.318 0.123 0.150 0.560 
Tolerance 348 0.647 0.088 0.470 0.830 
Latitude 528 0.358 0.184  0.056 0.667 
Civil liberties 372 2.753 1.226 1.000 5.000 
To test our hypotheses empirically, we use the dynamic GMM method proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). The 
procedure for applying this technique is well-documented by Pääkkönen (2010), Lee and 
Kim (2009), and Eicher and Schreiber (2010). It requires that the equation is first-
differenced to eliminate the heterogeneity in production functions and then an 
instrumental variable method is applied on the differenced model, with lagged values of 
the endogenous variables used as instruments for the variables themselves. To avoid an 
overfitting bias, we often restrict instruments to only the first, second, and third lags of 
the respective variables, since they usually correlate most closely to the major 
explanatory variables (Pääkkönen 2010). We further use the STATA collapse sub-option 
to create one instrument for each variable and lag distance rather than one for each time 
period, variable, and lag distance. We also add the sub-options small to request small-
sample corrections to the covariance matrix estimate. We calculate a two step estimator 
instead of a one step. To demonstrate the correctness of the model, we report the 
number of instruments generated by the model, the results from a Hansen 
overidentification test, and the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) serial correlation in the 
residuals. STATA command extabond2 is used for calculating the model parameters.  
In line with Pääkkönen’s study (2010), we utilize yearly data for the period from 
1996 to 2008. We exclude the initial transition years from the analysis, since the outset 
of transition entailed profound systemic changes (Fidrmuc 2003) and a deep economic 
recession. We apply the same model to both subsamples while ensuring that a standard 
set of conditioning variables and standard periods are used. Our base growth model 
includes two variables: investment and inflation. Investment is included, since it is the 
key factor in the majority of growth models (Solow 1956). Macroeconomic stability is, in 
turn, considered a precondition for economic recovery during transition in the post-
communist world (Fischer et al. 1996). For these two variables, we do not discuss 
differences in the coefficient estimates between the evolutionary and revolutionary 
subsamples, as this is beyond the scope of our research. We only focus on juxtaposing 
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the impact of formal economic institutions and political indexes on growth rates. 
Hence, the base model is:  
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + εit                                                                                                            (1) 
 
Where Yit is a measure of economic development limited to economic growth 
operationalized through an annual real GDP growth rate, Yit-1 is one-period-lagged 
economic growth. K stands for the investment in physical capital measured through 
gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP. MS represents macroeconomic stability 
captured by annual consumer price inflation. The main source for the above variables is 
the World Bank electronic database.  
We further include formal economic institutions, EI, into the base model: 
                                                              
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3EIit + εit                                                                                         (2) 
 
Similarly, we include formal political institutions (PI) into the base model as: 
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3PIit + εit                                                                                          (3) 
 
At this stage of the analysis, we are able to compare the coefficient estimates of 
the economic institutional variable, EI, and the political institutional variable, PI, 
between the evolutionary and revolutionary subsamples. The model for testing the 
impact of the quality of political elites and their decision-making on the institution 
formation process can be presented as follows:  
 
EI it=αEI it-1+ ρ1Life_expectit+ ρ2PIit +μit                                                                                                            (4) 
 
where EI is economic institutions, PI is political institutions, and Life_expect stands for 
life expectancy. Life expectancy is included in the equation, since it is considered a 
standard predictor of formal institutions, along with the latitude variable (see Acemoglu 
et al. (2001), Islam (2004) for the examples of institutional equations). Life expectancy 
captures a country’s disease environment (McArthur and Sachs 2001), which is believed 
to have predetermined the kind of formal institutions that initially emerged in a country 
and persisted over time (Acemoglu et al. 2001). Unlike a more conventional measure of 
the disease environment, such as settler mortality rates, this variable is available on an 
yearly basis and for all of the selected countries, including transition economies. Since 
formal institutions may influence the quality of life and impact life expectancy, we 
consider this variable endogenous and insert it into the gmmstyle option to instrument it 
with the lagged values of the variable itself. In contrast, the latitude variable is 
considered strictly exogenous and is included in the ivstyle option.  
To gauge the effects of adjusting national cultures and economic structures to 
new formal institutions on the quality of institutional grafting processes, we run a 
multilevel analysis. We use the cross-sectional time series for the period from 1996 to 
2008 but treat them as a cross-sectional sample in which years represent cases grouped 
by countries. The main objective here is to analyze the impact that the quality of 
economic structures and cultures have on the institution formation process. We expect 
that countries had a greater improvement in legal institutions when the economic 
structure was closer to the capitalist world either at the transition’s outset or was 
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reformed as such during the transition.4 Similarly, we anticipate that countries with more 
advanced capitalist values, either at the transition’s outset or improved by the transition, 
were able to build better formal economic institutions.5 The change in institutions can 
hence be modeled as a function of the quality of cultural values and economic 
structures: 
 
EI_CHANGEij= γ00 + γ10Xij + γ20CULTURESij + γ30ECON_STRUCTUREij + 
moj+ εij                                                                                                                                         (5) 
 
Where EI_CHANGE stands for an annual change occurring in each of the 
selected economic institutions during the period analyzed and is calculated as 
[(Economic Institutional index in year t - Economic Institutional index in year (t-1)]. X 
is a set of control variables, while CULTURES describes the quality of culture in a 
country. Tabellini (2008) suggests that culture can be approximated through values 
relevant to obedience, trust, respect, and control over life. We source these variables 
from the World Values Survey (WVS). Obedience represents the percentage of people 
in the sample who mentioned obedience as an important factor in society. Trust and 
respect are positive responses to questions about trusting most of the people and 
whether most people show tolerance and respect towards others. Control is 
operationalized through the question about how much freedom of choice and control 
people have over their own lives. We do not construct a single measure out of the four 
items since principle component factor analysis suggests that the four items load poorly 
on the same construct given the small sample of transition economies. 
ECON_STRUCTURE stands for the quality of economic structures and reflects a 
government’s success in adjusting a country’s economic structures to the standards of a 
free market economy. We follow Eicher and Schreiber (2010) and Hall and Jones (1999) 
and utilize the EBRD measures to construct a structural policy index, consisting of price 
liberalization, foreign exchange/trade liberalization, small/large scale privatization, 
enterprise reform, competition policy reform, banking sector reform, and non-banking 
financial institutional reform. We use the STATA predict option for factor analysis to 
construct a single construct. moj is the variance at the group level, and εij is the variance at 
the year level. We limit this analysis to the base revolutionary subsample, since the 
structural policy index is only available for this set of economies. 
5. Empirical results 
The empirical results largely support our expectations, suggesting that the 
relationship between economic institutions and economic growth acquires specific 
characteristics during transition. The economic institutional index strongly affects 
growth rates of economies operating within the institutions formed via evolutionary 
                                                 
4 In contrast to CIS countries, the existence of private property in Central Europe contributed to the de-politization 
of the economy by creating wealthy businessmen and an economic elite. This helped to minimize rent-seeking 
opportunities during transition and established demand for introducing effective private property rights. 
5 For instance, Poland developed capitalist informal norms in the context of private business interactions due to a 
small but legitimate number of private firms that were tolerated throughout the communist regime (Boettke et al. 
2008). Following the collapse of communism and the subsequent privatization efforts, it was easier for both the 
population and politicians to build on these underlying behavioral values and to accept private business on a much 
grander scale (Boettke et al. 2008). This stands in stark contrast to the CIS countries where the value of private 
property was nonexistent during Soviet times. 
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institutional change for both the base and extended subsamples (see tables 3 and 4). By 
contrast, the economic performance of countries in the base revolutionary subsample 
lacks a positive association with formal economic institutions in the short run. However, 
we establish a strong positive relationship between institutional indexes and growth 
rates when the analysis shifts to the extended revolutionary subsample. A careful 
revision of the country list for this subsample and retaining only those countries6 that 
strictly meet the selection criteria provides results that are nonetheless in line with 
hypothesis 1. We find that property rights protection and contract enforcement 
legislation have a positive impact on economic growth, but this impact is substantially 
smaller in the case of the extended revolutionary sample. Moreover, these results stand 
up to the alternative model specification choice and to the exclusion of resource-rich 
countries from the extended subsamples.  
In the long run, economic institutions of countries in both the base and 
extended revolutionary subsamples developed some relationship with rates of economic 
growth. If relating lagged values of institutional indexes to growth rates (see column 1 in 
tables 5 and 6), one finds a positive association between the two variables, which is 
commensurate with hypothesis 2(a). A closer analysis of institutional effects on 
economic performance when such institutions are formed revolutionarily suggests that 
this impact is often non-linear, which is consistent with hypothesis 2(b). The negative 
coefficient on the main effect of the economic institutional variable (see column 2 in 
tables 5 and 6) suggests that when new formal institutions are of poor quality (the values 
of the legal variable are low), such formal institutions constitute a negative growth 
factor. In turn, a positive quadratic term means that, as the quality of institutions 
improves, the negative effect is offset and formal institutions become a positive 
determinant of economic growth. A similar non-linear relationship was also found by 
Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) in the relationship between economic reforms and economic 
growth in the post-communist region and by De Melo et al. (1997) concerning the 
impact of structural reforms on economic growth. 
The initially negative impact of transition reforms on economic growth is often 
explained by high adjustment costs (De Melo et al. 1997), which turns into a positive 
impact in subsequent years (Falcetti et al. 2000). Alternatively, this may imply that when 
the quality of formal institutions is poor, they are either of an extractive nature or allow 
wide rent-seeking in the economy, hindering economic development. The example of 
privatization in the former Soviet Republics demonstrates how establishing the 
institution of private property, which was necessary for wide-scale privatization, could 
harm local economies by causing a considerable output drop.  
This non-linear relationship between economic institutions and rates of 
economic growth suggests that economies from the revolutionary subsamples may grow 
fast even if formal institutions are poorly developed. Accounting for the level of 
institutional enforcement may contribute to clarifying these unusual results:7 By allowing 
the economic institutional variable and the corruption perceptions index to interact, we 
obtained evidence for the smoothing effects of poor enforcement of confusing formal 
                                                 
6 The following countries were excluded from the extended revolutionary subsample for the revised analysis: 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Guatemala, Indonesia, El Salvador, Lesotho, and Mozambique. These countries are retained for 
further analysis to keep both subsamples (evolutionary and revolutionary) similar in size.  
7 We use a corruption perceptions index constructed by Transparency International to measure the level of 
enforcement of formal economic institutions. The values of the index vary from 1 (complete corruption) to 10 (no 
corruption). 
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institutions on the dynamics of economic growth. Accordingly, improvements in 
enforcement levels of formal institutions without improving such institutions may 
impair economic development in transition countries (see column 4 in table 5). If the 
enforcement mechanism is coupled with improving the quality of property rights and 
contract enforcement legislation, the main negative effect is offset and reducing 
corruption fosters economic development. We found a similar relationship for the 
extended revolutionary sample, but the results remain statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that post-communist economies may represent a particular group (see table 
6).  
Tables 7 to 10 juxtapose the impact of political settings on economic growth 
between the evolutionary and revolutionary subsamples. The results are largely 
consistent with the expectations formulated in hypothesis 3 and suggest that economies 
operating within an institutional framework formed revolutionarily are more sensitive to 
the quality of their political sector, especially concerning political decision-making. The 
policymaking quality index develops a closer relationship with rates of economic growth 
when the formation of economic institutions follows a revolutionary pathway. For 
countries that underwent the evolutionary method of institution building, it is more 
important that strong democratic settings exist to allow these economies to grow faster. 
The results also remain robust to alternative model specification choices or to the 
exclusion of resource rich countries from the extended subsamples. 
Interestingly, our results also indicate that the policymaking quality may 
negatively impact growth rates of countries in the evolutionary subsample. This is in line 
with existing studies, since many governmental policies were found to have a mixed 
effect on economic growth depending on a country’s economic development level. In 
Scandinavian countries, welfare state policies are, for instance, believed to discourage 
people from saving, leading to a reduction in capital available for reinvestment and 
thereby reducing growth rates. Furthermore, the taxes necessary to finance such policies 
may reduce the return to innovation. Studies for Latin America, in contrast, 
demonstrate that welfare state policies are a positive determinant for growth, since they 
help to reduce income inequalities that are detrimental to economic growth. A wide 
income distribution may cause social and political unrest, which discourages economic 
activity and investment and slows down growth (see Arjona et al. 2002 for more details).  
Table 11 furnishes evidence supporting hypothesis 4 and suggests that the 
quality of the political environment is of utmost importance in forming economic 
institutions when such institutions are established revolutionarily. Economic institutions 
prove particularly sensitive to the quality of political decision-making. By contrast, 
countries that largely rely on the evolutionary method of institutional change become 
relatively independent from the quality of their political system and policymaking. These 
results hold true for both base and extended subsamples. 
Additionally, table 12 contains results suggesting that post-communist countries 
which underwent more structural reforms and which are characterized by better cultural 
values are associated with greater improvements in formal economic institutions. This is 
consistent with hypothesis 5. Controlling for EU membership or membership in the 
former Soviet Union does not change the logic of our findings. Similarly, excluding 
resource rich countries from the subsample does not change the results.   
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Table 3. The impact of economic institutional indexes on economic growth during evolutionary institutional change  
VARIABLES 
Evolutionary institutional change 
Base subsample Extended subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) 0.330* -0.095*** 0.882** -0.121*** -0.245*** 
 (0.173) (0.019) (0.437) (0.005) (0.007) 
Ln(capital formation) -0.162 4.154*** -1.737 2.808*** 4.545*** 
 (2.366) (0.537) (3.938) (0.223) (0.232) 
Ln(inflation) 0.122 -0.490*** -0.129 -0.373*** -0.337*** 
 (0.485) (0.084) (0.495) (0.035) (0.043) 
Economic institutions 1.032* 0.219** 1.211** 0.121*** 0.160*** 
 (0.573) (0.105) (0.556) (0.024) (0.012) 
Number of instruments  9 21 9 40 32 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.170 0.507 0.201 0.301 0.383 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.885 0.104 0.278 0.241 0.210 
Number of observations 128 128 236 236 190 
Number of countries 22 22 42 42 33 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 report results for the base subsample; Columns 3, 4 and 5 contain results for the extended subsample. Column (1): 
All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. In addition to the specification choices described in the methodological section of the 
manuscript, we use the sub-option noleveleq that invokes difference instead of system GMM. Instruments are restricted to the second and third lags of the respective 
variables; Column (2): Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. An alternative specification of the model is used such as restricting instruments only to the third, 
fourth and fifth lags of the respective variables; Column (3): The model used in Column 1 is applied to the extended revolutionary sample; Column (4) Instruments are 
restricted to the fifth lags of the respective variables and the collapse sub-option is omitted. Time dummies are included in the ivstyle option; Column (5) Resource rich 
countries are excluded from the analysis.  
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
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Table 4. The impact of economic institutional indexes on economic growth during revolutionary institutional change 
VARIABLES 
Revolutionary institutional change 
Base subsample Extended subsample Revised extended subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) 0.179 0.207*** 0.249 0.140*** 0.323*** 0.033 -0.030 -0.004 
 (0.144) (0.040) (0.169) (0.025) (0.045) (0.192) (0.022) (0.025) 
Ln(capital formation) -0.913 -0.044 1.395 -0.186 -1.137*** 1.586 1.075*** 1.155*** 
 (1.822) (0.238) (2.182) (0.212) (0.142) (1.553) (0.149) (0.102) 
Ln(inflation) 0.191*** -0.126*** -0.430 0.030** -0.058** -0.270 -0.100*** -0.105*** 
 (0.063) (0.033) (0.321) (0.012) (0.023) (0.168) (0.012) (0.011) 
Economic institutions -0.367 -0.023 -0.004 0.200*** 0.128*** -0.186 0.054** 0.045 
 (0.266) (0.025) (0.254) (0.007) (0.031) (0.282) (0.026) (0.030) 
Number of instruments  9 17 9 40 32 9 32 32 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.623 0.330 0.292 0.435 0.292 0.574 0.349 0.394 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.400 0.349 0.504 0.106 0.348 0.407 0.301 0.388 
Number of observations 130 130 227 227 209 188 188 180 
Number of countries 21 21 40 40 36 33 33 32 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The model specification choices are the same as table 3. Columns (6) to (8) use the specification choices of columns 3 to 5 (table 3) 
but without the ivstyle option so that the number of instruments are fewer than the number of country groups. The revised extended sample does not include the 
following countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Guatemala, Indonesia, El Salvador, Lesotho, and Mozambique. 
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 
  
18 
 Table 5. Extended analysis of economic institutional effects on growth for the base revolutionary subsample  
VARIABLES 
Base revolutionary subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) 0.295*** 0.385*** 0.138*** 0.166*** 
 (0.098) (0.097) (0.028) (0.049) 
Ln(capital formation) -0.034 -0.205 -0.382*** -0.689** 
 (0.324) (0.372) (0.126) (0.273) 
Ln(inflation) -0.314*** -0.151** -0.146*** -0.145*** 
 (0.066) (0.054) (0.039) (0.048) 
Economic institutions t-1 0.151***    
 (0.049)    
Economic institutions  -2.065*** -0.031 -0.457* 
  (0.723) (0.041) (0.223) 
Economic institutions_2  0.215**   
  (0.076)   
Cpi   0.423*** -0.424 
   (0.130) (0.439) 
Economic institutions * Cpi    0.143* 
    (0.069) 
Number of instruments  16 17 19 19 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.159 0.457 0.494 0.410 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.713 0.774 0.413 0.428 
Number of observations 113 130 126 126 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. In addition to specification choices described in the methodological section of the manuscript, we use the sub-option noleveleq that 
invokes difference instead of system GMM. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted only to the second or 
third lags of the respective variables. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
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Table 6. Extended analysis of economic institutions' effects on growth for the extended revolutionary subsample  
VARIABLES 
Extended revolutionary subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) 0.310*** 0.395*** 0.377*** 0.371*** 
 (0.074) (0.091) (0.061) (0.063) 
Ln(capital formation) -0.592 -0.369 0.523** 0.481* 
 (0.404) (0.386) (0.247) (0.267) 
Ln(inflation) -0.249*** -0.165* -0.131** -0.131** 
 (0.082) (0.087) (0.050) (0.050) 
Economic institutions t-1 0.384***    
 (0.073)    
Economic institutions  -1.810* 0.168** 0.050 
  (1.072) (0.066) (0.249) 
Economic institutions_2  0.206*   
  (0.116)   
Cpi   -0.198** -0.491 
   (0.074) (0.547) 
Economic institutions * Cpi    0.043 
    (0.084) 
Number of instruments  16 17 26 26 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.099 0.101 0.155 0.187 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.846 0.797 0.529 0.579 
Number of observations 203 227 259 259 
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The model specification choice is the same as table 5.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
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Table 7. The impact of democratic settings quality on economic growth during evolutionary institutional change  
Note:. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results for the base subsample; Columns 4, 5 and 6 contain results for the extended subsample. Column 
(1): In addition to specification choices described in the methodological section of the manuscript, we use the sub-option noleveleq that invokes difference instead of 
system GMM. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option; Column (2): Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column 
(3): An alternative model specification choice is used such as restricting instruments only to the third or fourth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): Specification 
choice of Model 3 is applied to the extended subsample; Column (5): The collapse sub-option is omitted; Column (6): Resource rich countries are deleted from the 
analysis.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
VARIABLES 
Evolutionary institutional change 
Base subsample Extended subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) -0.084** -0.144*** 0.034 0.099 -0.047** -0.191*** 
 (0.039) (0.011) (0.161) (0.149) (0.018) (0.030) 
Ln(capital formation) -0.341 1.279** 3.618** 1.029 1.552*** 2.909*** 
 (1.173) (0.609) (1.563) (1.802) (0.363) (0.544) 
Ln(inflation) -0.094 -0.349*** -1.242*** -0.630*** -0.373*** -0.215*** 
 (0.099) (0.066) (0.303) (0.200) (0.034) (0.027) 
Democratic settings quality 3.426*** 0.783* 2.420* -1.068 0.634** 0.495** 
 (0.623) (0.426) (1.221) (0.900) (0.273) (0.207) 
       
Number of instruments  13 19 11 11 35 29 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.102 0.359 0.464 0.126 0.318 0.229 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > 
z) 
0.103 0.109 0.102 0.688 0.575 0.326 
Number of observations 100 100 100 194 194 148 
Number of countries 22 22 22 44 44 33 
  
21 
Table 8. The impact of democratic settings quality on economic growth during revolutionary institutional change 
VARIABLES 
Revolutionary institutional change 
Base subsample Extended subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) -0.241** -0.021* 0.414 0.439** 0.240*** 0.226*** 
 (0.085) (0.011) (0.259) (0.187) (0.052) (0.046) 
Ln(capital formation) 0.298 0.429*** 0.152 -0.233 0.111 -0.125 
 (0.404) (0.062) (0.241) (0.588) (0.080) (0.141) 
Ln(inflation) -0.014 -0.113*** -0.293* -0.461** -0.136*** -0.106** 
 (0.039) (0.026) (0.143) (0.201) (0.048) (0.050) 
Democratic settings quality -0.967 0.262 0.199 4.222*** 2.713*** 1.906*** 
 (0.764) (0.380) (1.348) (1.315) (0.305) (0.375) 
       
Number of instruments  13 19 11 11 35 29 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.102 0.243 0.106 0.110 0.211 0.229 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > 
z) 
0.532 0.338 
 
0.930 
 
0.816 
 
0.817 0.185 
Number of observations 116 116 116 208 208 187 
Number of countries 21 21 21 41 41 37 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The model specification choice is the same as table 7. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results for the base subsample; Columns 4, 5 and 6 
contain results for the extended subsample. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
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Table 9. The impact of policymaking quality on economic growth during evolutionary institutional change 
VARIABLES 
Evolutionary institutional change 
Base subsample Extended subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) -0.172*** -0.170*** 0.175 0.275 -0.069*** -0.241*** 
 (0.036) (0.018) (0.107) (0.176) (0.022) (0.023) 
Ln(capital formation) 0.766 1.633** 1.654** 1.518 1.995*** 3.226*** 
 (0.864) (0.732) (0.702) (1.181) (0.353) (0.386) 
Ln(inflation) -0.331** -0.452*** -0.776*** -0.589*** -0.430*** -0.203*** 
 (0.149) (0.091) (0.097) (0.168) (0.050) (0.066) 
Policy-making quality -1.422* -0.603 -0.437** 1.479 -0.820** -0.342 
 (0.699) (0.357) (0.192) (1.631) (0.358) (0.320) 
       
Number of instruments  13 19 18 11 35 29 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.188 0.384 0.331 0.088 0.329 0.420 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.100 0.078 0.281 0.919 0.657 0.391 
Number of observations 100 100 142 197 197 151 
Number of countries 22 22 22 45 45 34 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The model specification choice is the same as table 7. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results for the base subsample; Columns 4, 5 and 6 
contain results for the extended subsample. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
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Table 10. The impact of policymaking quality on economic growth during revolutionary institutional change 
VARIABLES 
Revolutionary institutional change 
Base subsample Extended subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(GDP_growth_rate t-1) -0.238*** -0.067*** 0.364 0.444** 0.328*** 0.332*** 
 (0.056) (0.019) (0.232) (0.220) (0.042) (0.031) 
Ln(capital formation) -0.066 0.269** 0.490 -0.220 0.433*** 0.473*** 
 (0.506) (0.105) (0.373) (0.667) (0.089) (0.065) 
Ln(inflation) -0.025 -0.133*** -0.561*** -0.538* -0.221*** -0.205*** 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.175) (0.293) (0.041) (0.031) 
Policy-making quality 0.635 0.828*** 0.919*** 1.978* 0.533*** 0.414*** 
 (0.448) (0.156) (0.320) (1.021) (0.156) (0.113) 
       
Number of instruments  13 19 11 11 35 35 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.120 0.255 0.097 0.068 0.173 0.297 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr 
> z) 
0.099 0.219 0.389 0.546 0.437 0.963 
Number of observations 116 116 116 208 208 187 
Number of countries 21 21 21 41 41 37 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The model specification choice is the same as table 7. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report results for the base subsample; Columns 4, 5 and 6 
contain results for the extended subsample. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
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Table 11. The impact of political indexes on formal economic institutions, by mode of institutional formation 
VARIABLES  
Evolutionary institutional change Revolutionary institutional change 
Base subsample Extended subsample Base subsample Extended subsample 
Economic_institutions t-1 0.993*** 0.611** 0.864*** 0.868*** 0.360 0.431*** 0.301*** 0.302*** 
 (0.090) (0.279) (0.027) (0.035) (0.253) (0.070) (0.039) (0.028) 
Life expectancy 0.003 -0.051 -0.021 -0.020 -0.008 -0.015 0.131*** 0.061*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.158) (0.048) (0.013) (0.022) 
Democratic settings quality 0.210  -0.516***  -2.544  0.628*  
 (0.520)  (0.127)  (3.509)  (0.343)  
Policy-making quality  1.211  -0.607  1.209***  1.354*** 
  (0.966)  (0.370)  (0.383)  (0.149) 
         
Number of instruments  10 10 28 28 10 10 28 28 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.286 0.104 0.243 0.519 0.373 0.099 0.134 0.116 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > 
z) 
0.478 0.649 0.729 0.977 0.200 0.182 0.106 0.105 
Number of observations 132 132 262 262 102 102 225 225 
Number of countries 22 22 44 44 20 20 42 42 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. We use the sub-option noleveleq that invokes difference instead of system GMM. All the variables specified in the model are 
included in the gmmstyle option. Time dummies and the latitude variable are included in the ivstyle option. We restrict instruments only to the third lags of the respective 
variables. The collapse sub-option is used for the base samples to reduce the number of instruments but is omitted for the extended samples in order to achieve 
satisfactory results for the overidentification test.   
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
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Table 12. Associations between changes in economic institutions, cultures, and economic structures 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic structure 0.548* 0.660** 0.579* 0.601* 
 (0.311) (0.319) (0.329) (0.342) 
Social trust -2.460 -0.517 0.926 1.554 
 (2.969) (3.251) (3.351) (3.518) 
Freedom of choice -0.579** -0.441* -0.333 -0.264 
 (0.225) (0.244) (0.252) (0.273) 
Obedience -1.588 -1.699 -2.123* -2.210* 
 (1.163) (1.158) (1.179) (1.212) 
Tolerance  4.223** 5.207*** 6.203*** 6.183*** 
 (1.809) (1.926) (2.011) (2.064) 
Life expectancy -0.127* -0.116 -0.133* -0.131* 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) 
Latitude -3.313 -5.826* -7.981** -5.907 
 (2.886) (3.369) (3.609) (4.596) 
Civil liberties 0.151 0.116 0.166 0.280 
 (0.157) (0.158) (0.160) (0.215) 
Soviet Union dummy  0.519 0.640* 0.504 
  (0.365) (0.370) (0.421) 
EU membership dummy   0.616 0.576 
   (0.390) (0.401) 
Constant 12.570** 11.060* 11.490* 9.521 
 (6.134) (6.186) (6.141) (6.808) 
     
Observations 150 150 150 141 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The associations should be interpreted with some caution since the 
cause-effect mechanism can run in both directions. Model (4) excludes resource rich countries.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
Overall, the empirical analysis supports the original hypotheses. Moreover, the 
results can be considered robust given the selected robustness check strategies: (1) the 
evolutionary subsample included economically developing countries to avoid the 
difference in coefficients being caused by variances in the level of economic or 
institutional maturity between the two subsamples; (2) we included non-post-communist 
countries in the revolutionary subsample to verify whether the specificities found for 
post-communist countries are universal or unique to the post-communist world; (3) we 
eliminated resource rich countries and small economies from both subsamples. The list 
of such countries was retrieved from Mankiw et al. (1992); (4) where possible, we 
controlled for EU membership in the base revolutionary subsample; (5) where possible, 
we controlled for former Soviet Union membership to verify whether the peculiarities in 
the relationship between formal institutions and economic growth are caused by the 
Soviet Union legacy. One should note that the results for transition economies show 
slight peculiarities as compared to other countries from the revolutionary subsample. 
We believe that this difference is due to specificities of the socialist regime. While 
Communism represented a dictatorship, it was characterized by relatively high 
industrialization levels, albeit militarized to a great extent, a highly educated labor force, 
high levels of urbanization, and extended social programs. 
6. Conclusion and discussion  
This study confirms the idea that the impact of formal economic institutions on growth 
rates may vary depending on how such institutions emerge. Our paper demonstrates 
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that the relationship between legal rules and economic growth can be peculiar when 
these rules are created via revolutionary institutional change characterized by a top-
down approach to institution building. This mode of institution emergence can create 
incompatibilities between the logic of the new formal institutions and existing cultures, 
on the one hand, and local economic structures, on the other hand. Since institution 
building is handled by politicians and occurs in the political sector, the quality of 
political institutions and political decision-making determines the quality of the new 
formal institutions and growth rates in the course of transition. Our analysis provides 
empirical evidence supporting both of these ideas. A weak political context leads to 
more extractive legal institutions that harm growth. High quality political institutions, in 
contrast, produce well defined and efficiently enforced formal institutions and enable 
rapid economic growth. Good political institutions are also more likely to detect and 
eliminate gaps in the logic of the new formal institutions and the two structures, thereby 
offsetting frictions in the economy caused by these incompatibilities and enabling the 
local economy to grow faster.  
Drawing on this understanding of growth determinants during transition, we 
suggest that reforms begin with the political sector and aim to introduce robust political 
settings. When such political contexts are in place, the country can proceed with 
building new property rights and contract enforcement legislation while ensuring that 
this legislation is in tune with local cultures and economic structures. If this is not the 
case, structural policies and policies aimed at strengthening new modes of thinking 
should be introduced. In this way, transitions to new political and economic regimes 
may have more chances of success.  
Future research is needed to eliminate three major limitations of our study. First, 
a more careful grouping of countries for both subsamples is necessary to eliminate stark 
heterogeneities in their political, economic, social, and historical characteristics. Second, 
one should consider integrating countries with unstable regime trends into the analysis. 
Finally, alternative economic development measures should be used to demonstrate the 
robustness of our findings on the impact that the mode of institution building has on 
patterns of economic progress in the world. 
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Appendix 1. GDP per capita in the selected post-communist countries at the outset of transition (1990), in 
1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars 
Country GDP per capita 
Albania 2,499 
Armenia 6,066 
Azerbaijan 4,639 
Bulgaria 5,597 
Croatia 7,351 
Czech Republic 8,895 
Estonia 10,820 
Georgia 7,616 
Hungary 6,459 
Kyrgyz Republic 3,602 
Latvia 9,916 
Lithuania 8,663 
Macedonia 3,972 
Moldova 6,170 
Poland 5,113 
Romania 3,511 
Russia 7,779 
Serbia 5,011 
Slovakia 7,763 
Slovenia 10,860 
Ukraine 6,027 
Source: Maddison Historical GDP Data 
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Appendix 2. Description of country choice for the evolutionary and revolutionary subsamples 
Country Choice Notes 
Afghanistan Not included  Recent history of military intervention  
Albania  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Algeria  Not included  Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points 
Angola  Not included Insufficient change (the benchmark of 6 not 
reached) 
Argentina  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Armenia  Included in the revolutionary sample History of reverse trend but included due to 
the insufficient number of transition countries 
in the subsample  
Australia  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich 
Austria Included in the evolutionary sample  
Azerbaijan  Included in the revolutionary sample History of reverse trend but included due to 
the insufficient number of transition countries 
in the subsample 
Bahrain  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich  
Bangladesh  Included in the revolutionary sample Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points but after 2006. Slightly insufficient 
starting point (slightly above -6) 
Belarus  Not included  Recursive movement to autocracy 
Belgium  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Benin  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Bhutan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points 
Bolivia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Bosnia Not included No data on polity scores 
Botswana  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Brazil   Included in the revolutionary sample Profound political change occurs but in 
stages. Resource rich 
Bulgaria  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Burkina Faso  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points 
Burundi Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Cambodia Not included Insufficient and unstable change 
Cameroon  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Canada  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich 
Cape Verde Not included Insufficient starting point for change (above -
6) 
Cen. Afr. Rep. Not included Insufficient change (the benchmark of 6 not 
reached) 
Chad Not included Insufficient change 
Chile  Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
China Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich 
Colombia Included in the evolutionary sample  
Comoros Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points 
Congo Not included Insufficient and unstable change 
Costa Rica Included in the evolutionary sample  
Croatia Included in the revolutionary sample Starting point of change is slightly above -6 
Cuba Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
Cyprus Not included Insufficient history of regime trend  
Czech 
Republic 
Included in the revolutionary sample   
Denmark Included in the evolutionary sample  
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Djibouti  Not included Insufficient change  
Dominican 
Republic  
Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Congo 
Kinshasa  
Not included Insufficient change 
East Timor  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend available  
Ecuador  Not included Insufficient starting point for change (above -
6) 
Egypt  Included in the evolutionary sample  
El Salvador  Included in the revolutionary sample Change is in the early 1980s and is relatively 
durable 
Equatorial 
Guinea  
Included in the evolutionary sample  
Eritrea Not included Insufficient history of regime trend available 
Estonia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Ethiopia  Not included Insufficient change 
Fiji Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than three 
points   
Finland  Included in the evolutionary sample  
France  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Gabon  Not included Insufficient change  
Gambia  Not included Change is from democracy to autocracy  
Georgia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Germany  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Ghana  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Greece  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Guatemala  Included in the revolutionary sample Full transition is reached but in two phases 
with few years apart 
Guinea-Bissau  Not included Unstable change 
Guinea  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich 
Guyana  Included in the revolutionary sample Resource rich 
Haiti  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than three 
points   
Honduras  Not included Insufficient starting point for change (above -
6) 
Hungary  Included in the revolutionary sample  
India  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Indonesia  Included in the revolutionary sample Change is recent (around the year 2000) 
Iran  Not included Unstable change  
Iraq Not included Recent history of military occupation  
Ireland  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Israel  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Italy  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Ivory Cost  Not included Insufficient change (the benchmark of 6 not 
reached) 
Jamaica  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Japan  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Jordan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Kazakhstan  Not included No transition to democracy  
Kenya  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Korea North  Not included A lot of missing values on key variables  
Korea South  Included in the revolutionary sample Starting point for change is slightly above -6 
Kosovo  Not included  Insufficient history of regime trend  
Kuwait  Not included  
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Kyrgyzstan  Included in the revolutionary sample Insufficient change (the benchmark of 6 not 
reached) but included due to the insufficient 
number of transition countries in the 
subsample 
Laos Not included  Change is from democracy to autocracy  
Latvia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Lebanon  Not included Recent history of military occupation  
Lesotho  Included in the revolutionary sample Change is around mid of 1990s. The country 
has recent experience with democracy. 
Resource rich 
Liberia Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
Libya Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
Lithuania  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Luxembourg  Included in the evolutionary sample Marked as small economy 
Macedonia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Madagascar  Included in the revolutionary sample There is a reverse trend but after 2006 
Malawi Included in the revolutionary sample  
Malaysia  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Mali  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Mauritania  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Mauritius  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Mexico  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich 
Moldova  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Mongolia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Montenegro  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Morocco Included in the evolutionary sample  
Mozambique  Included in the revolutionary sample The upper benchmark of 6 is slightly not 
reached). Change is around mid of 1990s.   
Myanmar  Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
Namibia Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Nepal Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Netherlands, 
the  
Included in the evolutionary sample  
New Zealand  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Nicaragua  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Niger  Not included Unstable change  
Nigeria  Not included Unstable change 
Norway  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich 
Oman  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich  
Pakistan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Panama Included in the revolutionary sample  
Papua N. G.  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Paraguay  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Peru  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Philippines  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Poland  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Portugal  Included in the evolutionary sample Change is shortly after 1970 
Qatar  Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
Romania  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Russia  Included in the revolutionary sample Resource rich, Fluctuations in regime trend  
but retained for the analysis due to the 
  
 
34 
insufficient number of transition countries in 
the subsample 
Rwanda  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Saudi Arabia  Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich  
Senegal  Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
Serbia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Sierra Leone  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Singapore  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Slovak Rep.  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Slovenia  Included in the revolutionary sample  
Solomon Isl.  Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Somalia  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
South Africa  Not included Insufficient starting point for change (above -
6) 
South Sudan  Not included No data on political trend are available  
Spain  Not included A lot of missing values on key variables 
Sri Lanka Included in the evolutionary sample Mild fluctuations in regime trend  
Sudan  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Suriname  Not included No data on political trend are available  
Swaziland  Not included Mixed change, difficult to classify 
Sweden  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Switzerland  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Syria  Included in the evolutionary sample Fluctuations in regime trend prior 1970 
Taiwan  Not included Change is in many stages  
Tajikistan  Not included Insufficient political change (the upper 
benchmark of 6 not reached) 
Tanzania  Not included Insufficient change 
Thailand  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than  3 
points   
Togo Not included Insufficient change (the upper benchmark of 
6 not reached) 
Trinidad  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Tunisia  Included in the evolutionary sample There is change but gradual  
Turkey Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Turkmenistan  Not included No transition to democracy  
UAE Not included Insufficient history of regime trend 
Uganda  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Ukraine  Included in the revolutionary sample  
United 
Kingdom, the  
Included in the evolutionary sample  
United States, 
the  
Included in the evolutionary sample Resource rich 
Uruguay  Included in the revolutionary sample History of brief reverse trend shortly after 
1970  
Uzbekistan  Not included No transition to democracy  
Venezuela  Not included Change is from democracy to autocracy  
Vietnam  Included in the evolutionary sample  
Yemen  Not included Fluctuations in regime trend greater than 3 
points   
Zambia  Included in the revolutionary sample Brief history of reverse trend  
Zimbabwe  Not included  Change is from democracy to autocracy 
Note: List of countries is sourced from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> 
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Appendix 3. List of countries used in the analysis 
Evolutionary subsamples Revolutionary subsamples 
Base Extended Base Extended 
Australia  Australia  Albania  Albania  
Austria  Austria  Armenia Argentina  
Belgium  Bahrain  Azerbaijan Armenia 
China  Belgium  Bulgaria  Azerbaijan 
Colombia  Botswana Croatia Bangladesh 
Costa Rica  Cameroon  Czech Republic  Benin 
Denmark  Canada Estonia Bolivia 
Finland  China  Georgia Brazil  
Germany  Colombia  Hungary Bulgaria  
India Costa Rica  Kyrgyzstan  Croatia 
Ireland  Denmark  Latvia  Czech Republic  
Israel Egypt Lithuania  El Salvador  
Italy  Equatorial Guinea  Macedonia  Estonia 
Jamaica Finland  Moldova  Georgia 
Japan France  Poland Guatemala 
Netherlands, the   Germany  Romania  Guyana  
New Zealand  Greece  Russia  Hungary 
Norway  Guinea Serbia  Indonesia 
Sweden  India Slovakia  Korea South  
Switzerland  Ireland  Slovenia  Kyrgyzstan  
United Kingdom, the   Israel Ukraine  Latvia  
United States, the  Italy   Lesotho  
 Jamaica  Lithuania  
 Japan  Macedonia  
 Luxembourg   Madagascar  
 Mauritius   Malawi 
 Mexico  Mali  
 Morocco  Moldova  
 Netherlands, the    Mongolia  
 New Zealand   Mozambique  
 Norway   Panama 
 Oman   Paraguay 
 Portugal   Philippines  
 Rwanda   Poland 
 Saudi Arabia   Romania  
 Singapore  Russia  
 Sri Lanka   Serbia  
 Sweden   Slovakia  
 Switzerland   Slovenia  
 Syria   Ukraine  
 Trinidad   Uruguay 
 Tunisia   Zambia  
 United Kingdom, the     
 United States, the     
 Vietnam    
 
 
 
